Research
Research
Beyond Discriminatory Intent: Thin Institutional Intentions and Equal Protection
Work in Progress; Job Talk Paper
Louisiana v. Callais has renewed attention to the discriminatory intent doctrine. Under the doctrine, facially neutral state actions only violate equal protection if they can be traced to a discriminatory intent. While the disagreement in Callais between the majority and dissent concerned discriminatory intent’s role in enforcing equal protection, I challenge its role in a theory of what constitutes unconstitutional discrimination. Discriminatory intentions are not merely too difficult for plaintiffs to prove; they are too hard for legislatures to have. Philosophical theories of institutional intention suggest that disagreement among legislators about why to enact a facially neutral law may prevent a legislature from possessing discriminatory intent, even when the law should count as unconstitutional discrimination. I advance an alternative, normative theory of unconstitutional discrimination that accounts for cases of discrimination despite disagreement among legislators. The theory also explains why statutory disparate-impact liability should be reconcilable with equal protection—an especially salient question in the wake of Callais.
Connecting Mens Rea and Actus Reus: Toward a New Theory of Correspondence
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 2026 (link)
The justifiable imposition of criminal liability requires a defendant’s mens rea and actus reus “correspond”—they must be connected in a particular way. I argue none of the three extant theories of correspondence—contemporaneity, actuation, and normative theory—are adequate, but that insights from normative and actuation theory can be leveraged to point the way toward a better account.
Statuses, Acts, and Falling Asleep: A Critique of the Grants Pass Decision
Criminal Law Bulletin, 2025
I argue that while the Grants Pass dissent opted for a “Status Interpretation” of the Eighth Amendment, according to which statuses cannot be criminalized, it should have opted for the majority’s “Act Interpretation,” according to which only acts can be criminalized. A proper application of the Act Interpretation would have yielded the dissent’s conclusion.
What Taylor Swift and Beyonce Teach Us About Sex and Causes (with Robin Dembroff and Issa Kohler-Hausmann)
University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online, 2020 (link)
A "but-for" causal test is a poor test for locating instances of discrimination. Instead of relying on counterfactuals toggling an individual plaintiff's race or sex, courts should instead look to social explanations of how categories like race or sex operate.
Demystifying Decina: Intentionality and the Voluntary Act Requirement
Work in Progress
People v. Decina presents an enduring puzzle about the voluntary act requirement. I argue the puzzle can be solved by understanding voluntary acts as “opted for,” rather than (necessarily) intentional. “Opted for” acts are explainable by appeal to a lack of reasons a defendant had against acting.
Is the Correspondence Relation Normative or Descriptive?
Criminal Law and Philosophy, 2026 (link)
Descriptive theories of correspondence are more promising than normative ones. Conditioning correspondence on normative facts about culpability creates problematic circularity, while conditioning correspondence on normative facts about wrongdoing and responsibility fails to explain cases that an adequate theory of correspondence would capture.
Supposed Corpses and Correspondence
Free & Equal, 2025 (link)
Supposed corpse defendants unsuccessfully attempt to kill and, later, actually kill after mistaking their victim for dead. I explain why it is justifiable to hold such defendants liable for murder even though they did not kill intentionally.
The article was selected for discussion on the blog PEA Soup, with critical precis by Prof. Gabriel Mendlow.