On this page, you'll find short descriptions of both my published and unpublished work. Comments are always welcome and appreciated. Please contact me if you would like a copy of a published piece or draft.
Supposed Corpses and Correspondence (in Free & Equal, 2025): I advance a novel explanation for the intuition that it would be justifiable to hold supposed corpse defendants liable for murder. Supposed corpse defendants are those defendants who attempt to kill their victim and then, erroneously supposing they have succeeded, kill by disposing of what they take to be their victim's corpse (link here). The article was featured in a discussion on PEA Soup, with critical precis by Gabe Mendlow (link here).
Statuses, Acts, and Falling Asleep: A Critique of the Grants Pass Decision (in Criminal Law Bulletin, 2025): This short Article critiques the 2024 U.S. Supreme Court decision, City of Grants Pass v. Johnson. On my reading, Robinson v. California cued up three possible interpretations of the substantive protection against criminalization provided by the Eighth Amendment: an Act Interpretation, an Involuntariness Interpretation, and a Status Interpretation. I argue that on the Grant's Pass majority's Act Interpretation, the dissent's outcome was the correct one: homeless individuals are not punished for an actus reus when they are punished for falling asleep when they have no where else to be but in public.
Connecting Mens Rea and Actus Reus: Toward a New Theory of Correspondence (in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, forthcoming): This Article challenges existent theories of correspondence--the relation between mens rea and actus reus necessary for justifiable impositions of criminal liability--and upcycles the conditions the theories rely upon toward a more plausible theory.
Is the Correspondence Relation Normative or Descriptive? (in Criminal Law and Philosophy, forthcoming): I interpret and argue against suggestions from G.R. Sullivan, Gabe Mendlow, and Alex Sarch that correspondence might be explained by appeal to normative facts rather than descriptive ones. I argue normative theories are either circular or under-explanatory.
Toward a New Theory of Correspondence (dissertation): My dissertation represents the first book-length treatment of correspondence.
The principle of correspondence is a principle in Anglo-American criminal law. The principle maintains that mens rea ("guilty mind") and actus reus ("guilty act") must stand in a particular relation in order for an imposition of criminal liability to be justifiable. While the principle is well-recognized, there has been confusion about how to characterize the relation the principle references.
I argue that orthodox descriptive theories and newer normative theories alike struggle to capture the correspondence relation, and I do work toward advancing a more sophisticated descriptive theory: a theory that captures a normatively significant phenomenon without itself relying on any normative facts. The dissertation is co-advised by Michael Bratman and Gideon Yaffe, and I expect to complete it in the Spring of 2026.